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 The Problem of Power 
Arthur L. Wilson Cornell University, USA 
Tom Nesbit, Simon Fraser University, Canada 
 
Abstract: The purpose of this paper is to examine various critical theoretical  
traditions for what power is and how it works. 
 
A colleague of ours has remarked that once two people are together in a room they have 
to then deal with relationships of power.  Within the pervasive humanist traditions in North 
American adult education, adult educators do have a strong “people focus” to their practice and 
theory.  But because most theorists and many practitioners tend to ignore or deplore the workings 
of power in practice and theory, power continues to be problematic.  Those adult education 
theorists who do tend to the problem of power too often do so either presumptively (assuming we 
all know what power is – when we truly do not) or in under-theorized ways.  For example, a 
close examination of Cervero and Wilson’s (2001) Power in Practice, which purported to have 
theorists examining their own educational practices for elucidating their theories of power, 
illustrates that theorists can identify the workings of power in their practice but struggle with 
theorizing concretely about those workings.  This veiled recognition has a long tradition in 
academic adult education (Cervero & Wilson, in press).  Clearly Clark’s famous 1956 depiction 
of adult education’s institutional marginality was an analysis of the workings of power, yet it 
took Donaldson and Edelson (2000) to name it so theoretically.  Practitioners on the other hand 
often have sophisticated practical understandings of how power works, enough so that they are 
able to work effectively.  But too often they are unable to articulate their practical knowledge, 
and worse, their insights are routinely ignored by academic analysts.  Further, even though the 
academic field of adult education generally does not trouble itself with the problem of power, if 
we hear one more time academic or practitioner alike saying they have power “figured out” and 
then unknowingly recite Mary Parker Follett’s 80 year old dictum of “empowering” people by 
shifting from “power over” to “power with,” we think we will scream:  “No word is used more 
carelessly by us than the word ‘power.’  I know of no conception which needs to-day more 
careful analysis.  We have not even decided whether power is a ‘good’ word or a ‘bad’ word” 
(Follett, 1926, p. 9 in Metcalf & Urwick, n.d.).  Indeed, her caution is still valid today.  The 
prevalent view in adult education, when we think of it at all, would suggest we have made up our 
minds that power is bad while we continue to ignore prominent social and political theory that 
identifies the myriad ways of power in our educational work.   
Increasingly throughout the twentieth century power has become an ever more important 
question in much social inquiry:  “Although the precise effects of power [or even what it is, we 
would add] remain a subject of debate . . . the failure of previous accounts of power to fully 
comprehend the role of power in the shaping of human life” continues (Wartenburg, 1992, p. xi).  
Yet even within a hastening and sometimes vitriolic conversation – witness the contributions of 
Arendt, Benhabib, Bordieu, Dahl, Foucault, Fraser, Giddens, Habermas, Harvey, Kristeva, 
LeFebrve, Lukes, Said, Talburt, and others – theorists in academic adult education have 
continued languishing their time away by dreaming longingly of andragogical and Rogerian 
heavens here on earth.  We share the view that power remains a constituting phenomenon that is 
“always there” regardless of whether we take note of it practically or theoretically.  Thus, we 
believe there is a need to identify and understand the presence of power, how it works in the 
work of adult education, and what its consequences are both for the practical work we do as 
educators as well as how we theorize that practical work.  If, as we believe, power is “one of the 
fundamental realities of human social existence, a reality that explains the oppressive and 
demeaning nature of the conditions of human life” as well as  opportunities for change, then 
“power remains an important concept for explaining those conditions and thinking of possible 
means” (Wartenburg, 1992, p. ix) of using power to alter such conditions.  Therefore, the 
purpose of this paper is to examine critical social theory for what power is and how it works.  
Although we remain critical of previous accounts to understand power in shaping human life, we 
are under no illusion of expecting to provide a comprehensive account of the many meanings and 
manifestations of power.  We do intend to present a bit of a metanarrative (we hear the 
postmodernists moaning now) of several broad traditions of understanding power.  We do so in 
three parts.  First, we provide a brief critique of Cervero and Wilson’s (2001) depiction of 
theories of power in adult education.  Next, we provide an overview and expansion of our own 
recent analysis of theories of power (Nesbit & Wilson, in press) to include realist notions of 
power.  We conclude with a tentative contraction of that account to sketch four broad traditions 
of theorizing power:  behaviorist, communicative, decentered, and realist.  Although we can only 
introduce that effort here, we would expect to provoke debate but will settle for awareness.  
 
Adult Education Has No Face 
Often unable to keep the presence of power unfelt, historically the theoretical literature of 
American adult education has forthrightly and formally ignored power, preferring because of its 
persistent insistence on what we might term naïve structural-functionalism to rest its laurels on 
an overly technical interpretation of technical rationality (Cervero & Wilson, in press).  In 
contrast to the dominance of theoretical ignorance, there are contemporary examinations of 
power in North American adult education although such analyses do seem quite provincial at 
times.  Within a sporadic and often oblique discussion, Cervero and Wilson (2001) have 
identified and critiqued three traditions of understanding power in adult education:  the political 
as personal, the political as practical, and the political as structural.  By far the dominant 
approach to power in practice and theory in adult education is the first tradition.  In this view 
adult educators seek to neutrally facilitate andragogical, developmental, and transformational 
learning.  Individual change and development are thought to ultimately benefit society as a vague 
manifestation of humanist values and Enlightenment progress.  Because of the resolute focus on 
individual change, the political is thought of in terms of the personal and not believed to have 
any effect on educational practice.  At best naïve, such an accommodationist view is actually 
socially and politically reproductive of dominant power relations.  In the second tradition, the 
political as practical, adult educators understand power as the ability to “get things done” in 
organizational settings.  This understanding of power focuses on the political “how to” of 
achieving goals in power-saturated organizations.  Questions of what power is, how power 
works, and for whom in terms of adult education’s participation in and reproduction of typically 
inequitable systems of power are largely ignored.  Whereas the first tradition has a social vision 
of individual development, the second tradition largely lacks any social vision except the 
pragmatic pursuit of individual interests in surviving/manipulating organizational relations of 
power.  The political as structural tradition, a small but vibrant practical and theoretical tradition 
in adult education, calls explicitly for a redistribution of power through the practice of adult 
education.  Specific democratic values of dialog, deliberation, and social justice are championed 
through practical action which seeks to recognize, challenge, and change socially-structured 
relations of power constructed through and within economic, gender, racial, sexual, and cultural 
practices that benefit the few while disadvantaging many.   
These traditions in North American adult education do evidence in various ways how 
power is embedded and operates in a wide variety of settings and practices.  With the partial 
exceptance of the structural tradition, they are, however, typically unconcerned with, indeed, 
unaware of the productive and recursive nature and effects of power.  As many of the authors in 
Cervero and Wilson (2001) illustrate, even those who make a conscious effort to engage with 
questions of power tend to do so in terms of consequences of power rather than in efforts to 
understand power itself:  “they rarely undertake an explanatory analysis of the mechanisms by 
which educational processes and situations are linked to social structures or how power and 
authority are used to create systems of control within and between educational institutions” 
(Nesbit & Wilson, 2003, p. 309).  Thus, in discussions in adult education, power rarely, if ever, 
has a “face” (a reference to the “three faces of power” debate in political theory described 
below).  We have begun the paper with these traditions to argue that they have been able to 
provide only sparse critical insight into the political practice of adult education.  The broader 
social and political theory we now turn to provides far more robust understandings of the 
workings and effects of power.   
 
Three Faces and Beyond 
Naïve or what we might term folk or vulgar views of power almost always identify power 
as coercive force.  Certainly a profound everyday occurrence, such a view is far too limiting to 
be useful (it is this view that adult educators often presume when they assume a common 
understanding of power).  Because of this limited definition and the limited discussion in 
academic adult education, we have been investigating theories of power in critical social theory 
to understand origins, presence, and possibilities (Nesbit & Wilson, 2003, in press; Wilson & 
Cervero, 2002; Wilson & Nesbit, 2003, in press).  We initially began these investigations by 
examining specific critical social theorists such as Arendt, Bordieu, Foucault, Giddens, Harvey, 
and others who both evolve from but rapidly distance themselves from classic nineteenth century 
social theory of Marx, Weber, Durkheim, and others. Part of that transition is motivated by what 
Wartenberg describes as “the newly discovered complexity of the presence and workings of 
power in society” (1992, p. xxvi).  That discovery of course has a history.  Clegg (1989), 
Forester (1989), Isaac (1987), and Winter (1996) have shown how Dahl’s 1950s critique of 
Mills’ studies of elitist or sovereign forms of power introduced the first of the behaviorist three 
faces of power debate (A makes B do A’s will).  Bachrach and Baratz introduced the second face 
(the mobilization of bias) which Lukes (1974) subsequently turned into the full three faces 
debate (social-structural production of consent).  This behaviorist/empiricist/Humean causalist 
(Isaac, 1987; Winter, 1996) depiction of power soon was supplanted by the “newly discovered 
complexity” of power analyses by Benhabib, Bordieu, Foucault, Giddens, Harvey, Lefebrve, and 
so on in the 1970s/1980s.  
Our investigations into these analyses have enabled us (Nesbit & Wilson, in press) to 
describe four broad interpretive traditions which roughly parallel but encompass and transcend 
Cervero and Wilson’s three traditions:  agentic, structuralist, agentic-structuralist intergration, 
and social process.  Most theoretical discussions of power focus on the relative importance of 
either human agency or structural aspects on influencing behavior.  In North America, the 
agentic tradition is by far the most common (Clegg, 1989; Isaac, 1987) because it views power as 
“something” a person or group (an “agent”) “has.”  In classic political theory parlance, the 
theoretical depiction of vulgar views, A has the power/capacity through the exercise or potential 
to exercise force to make B do what A wants regardless of whether B wants to or not (Isaac, 
1987; Winter, 1996).  Clegg (1989) argues that we are “stuck” in an agentic view of power 
because so much of our contemporary understandings of power emanate from Thomas Hobbes’ 
view of power as sovereignty.  The agentic view is challenged by structuralist approaches in 
which power is understood as supra-individual and irreducible forces (e.g., class, race, gender, 
etc.) operating unseen and unacknowledged “behind the actor’s back” to influence/determine 
people and their activities.  Although still primarily behaviorist, Lukes’ (1974) “radical view” of 
power began the move from seeing power in simple empiricist, that is, measurable, terms and 
seeing power as emanating from structural forces (Clegg, 1989).  The production of consent, the 
third face that Lukes describes, Clegg argues, if left unchallenged, connects easily with Critical 
Theory’s insights about hegemonic cultural practices.  The agentic and structuralist views have 
produced and maintained a split between views of power as individually exercised and power as 
inherent in social forces.  Thus, these views remain “stuck” in a “simple” behaviorist reality of 
contingent regularities (Isaac, 1987; Winter, 1996).   
To get beyond the empiricist limitations of behaviorist/positivist interpretations, more 
recent efforts generate social constructionist insights to integrate agency and structure.  This 
intergrationist view is best represented by the work of Giddens (1984) whose structuration theory 
explains how people through their participation in social practices both produce outcomes as 
well as reproduce their capacities (i.e., power) to act in specific social relations.  Giddens 
resurrects the view that power is “relational,” that is, power relations are dependent and mutually 
constituting.  Integrationist traditions enable descriptions of power as a productive and 
generative social process rather than a pre-existing agentic or structuralist force, quality, or 
condition.  The chief architect of the social process approach is Foucault (1980), for whom 
power is neither a “thing” nor a quality, capacity, or possession of particular people.  Rather, it 
only takes shape through the joint agency of all those who participate in a given set of social 
relations.  Foucault’s approach challenges the totalizing characteristic of agentic and structuralist 
traditions: “it neither falsely subjectivizes power nor falsely elides agency” (Winter, 1996, p. 
728).  Foucault has revolutionized the analysis of power by locating it as a productive 
phenomenon constituting the very possibility of human interaction (Clegg, 1989; Wartenberg, 
1992; Winter, 1996).  Developing Machivellian rather than Hobbesian insights (Clegg, 1989), 
the operation of power for Foucault is an all-pervasive process from which no one escapes and in 
which everyone participates:  “Foucault argues that power is both ‘relational’ and ‘capillary,’ 
something that permeates every aspect of the social world.  There are no agents who are simply 
possessors of power and who can use it to dominate others.  Rather, power is itself something 
that permeates all social relationships and that constitutes all human beings” (Wartenberg, 1992, 
p. xxii).   
To our initial array, we now add a realist view of power.  Realism is a philosophy of 
science, beginning to influence social inquiry, that seeks to transcend the traditional notions of 
Humean causality (contingent regularities in the form of A co-varies with B, whose covariance 
thus enables the inference that A caused B) by positing what once would have been described as 
a “metaphysical” notion of causality; it does so by rejecting the empiricist view of causality 
deployed in the three faces debate (Clegg, 1989; Isaac, 1987).  Rather than focusing on 
observable contingent regularity, realists instead attempt to identify relatively enduring 
properties that are actually causal mechanisms:  “[the] realist approach is that human agency has 
social-structural preconditions . . . . social structures consist of this relatively enduring social 
relations between agents in the performance of definite social practices” (Isaac, 1987, p. 57).  
Within a realist analysis, “power is an enduring capacity to act, which may or may not be 
exercised on any particular occasion” (Isaac, 1987, p. 72).  In this view power is implicated in 
social structure and is a required but contingently operating feature of human agency.   
We are following the lead of others who have attempted to identify the intersections and 
linkages among what appear to be a vast but unconnectable array of disparate social analyses of 
power.  Examples include Isaac’s (1987) realist critique of the three faces of power debate, 
Clegg’s (1989, p. xv) “groupings” of “dispositional, agency, and facilitative concepts of power” 
as “circuits of power,” Wartenberg’s (1992) “rethinking of power” in terms of “the immersion of 
humans in nets of power relations” (p. xix), and Hayward’s (2000) “de-facing” of power.  
Lacking space we can only point to our future directions:  what do behaviorist, communicative, 
decentered, and realist views of power provide us for the theory and practice of adult education? 
 
So What 
In this paper we have started integrating what we have been learning from these various 
traditions about what power is and how it works.  We refrain from arguing for a particular point 
of view because we lack the hubris to believe a total or single theory of power is possible or 
desirable.  Indeed, a key argument we make in this paper is that there are many theories of 
power, and hence many problems, because power is recursively imbricated in all human 
interactions.  So, one might ask, who cares, why should we endeavor to understand power and its 
play in our educational work?  We suggest two reasons here.  First is a practical response.  The 
world is routinely, systematically unjust and power is a major facilitator of inequitable 
production and distribution of resources, benefits, accesses, etc.  Within a general “critical” 
project, we see the need to develop more adequate theories of power in order to improve the lives 
of human beings because much traditional theory (e.g., the three faces) has failed “to fully 
comprehend the role of power in shaping human life” (Wartenberg, 1992, p. xi).  We agree with 
Wartenberg that too many power theorists have been unable to appreciate the complexities and 
nuances of power:  “power manifests itself as a complex social presence that exists in an intricate 
network of overlapping and contradictory relations.  The task . . . is to provide a conception of 
power that does justice to its tangled empirical reality while at the same time providing the social 
theorists with a precise tool for criticizing social practices and institutions.  In particular, theories 
of power must explain the immersion of human beings in nets of power relations that constrain 
their possibilities while simultaneously uncovering the means by which human beings have the 
ability to resist and challenge those relations” (1992, p. xix).  Thus we wish to promote 
Wartenberg’s  argument for critical social inquiry that develops explanatory language that 
accounts for the “newly discovered complexity” of power and how it works.  Second, following 
on Wartenberg’s suggestion, we need more than awareness; we need means.  Because of the 
epistemological proclivities of academic adult education (among other conditions too numerous 
to detail), there is a fundamental problem with the discipline’s theoretical work:  the theory-
practice gap.  That gap has persisted for so long, we now take it for granted.  Among many 
reasons, the theory-gap persists because generally the discipline of adult education lacks a theory 
of practical action.  Isaac provides one example of why a theory of practical action is necessary:  
“Theories of power . . . should be conceived as interpretative models, developed by social 
scientists as submitted to the rigors of critical consideration, about social structures which shape 
human action and distribute the capacities to act among social agents” (1987, p. 75).  Neither 
adult education theory or much of its practice has generally been able to meet such a standard.  If 
we cannot “see” the conditions in which we enact our social practices (like education), then we 
can have little hope of challenging or changing inequitable ones.  This is the larger problem to 
which this paper is directed although we are only able to set the stage here for such an encounter.  
If we as a discipline are ever to have important things to say about the work of adult educators, 
then we have to work towards transcending this gap.  So we use the paper to begin developing a 
more general theory of power (or rather theories) via working toward a theory of practical action 
that sees power as a central constituent of human educational interaction.  Because power is 
constructed in and through social interactions, it is always alterable and disruptable, hence the 
importance of understanding and using power in adult education. 
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